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Technology Transfer and the Genome Project:
Problems with Patenting Research Tools*
Rebecca S. Eisenberg**

The human genome project provides government funds for
generating vast amounts of information in the hope that that
information will ultimately be put to use in developing new products
and processes for the diagnosis and treatment of human disease. 1 The
recent controversy surrounding the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
patent applications on thousands of partial complementary DNA
(cDNA) sequences 2 derived in government laboratories highlights
some of the complexities involved in achieving technology transfer in
such a project. 3 Although under its new leadership NIH has recently
changed course and decided not to pursue these patent rights, 4 the
controversy nonetheless provides a useful focal point for considering the
role of patents in technology transfer.
Federal policy since 1980 has reflected an increasingly confident
presumption that patenting discoveries made in the course of
government-sponsored research is the most effective way to promote
*
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1 U.S. Cong., Off. of Tech. Assessment, Mapping Our Genes (1988); Nat'l Res.
Council, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome (1988).
2 For a brief description of the technology, See Christopher J. Harnett, The
Human Genome Project and the Downside of Federal Technology Transfer, 5 Risk
151, 154 n.12 (1994). [Ed.]
3 See Rebecca Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257 Science

903 (1992); Reid Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Publics Expectations for
Knowledge and Commercialization, 257 Science 908 (1992); Thomas Kiley, Patents
on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?257 Science 915 (1992); Bernadine

Healy, Special Report on Gene Patenting,327 N. England J. Med. 664 (1992).
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technology transfer and commercial development of those discoveries
in the private sector. Whereas policy makers of prior generations may
have thought that the best way to achieve widespread use of the results
of government-sponsored research was to make them freely available to
the public, 5 advocates of the new pro-patent policy stress the need for
exclusive rights as an incentive for industry to undertake the further
costly investment necessary to bring new products to market. 6 In this
new way of thinking inventions that are made freely available to anyone
who wants them are presumed to languish in government and university
archives rather than to be actively exploited by all.
Yet the reactions of industry trade groups to the NIH patent
7
applications suggest that there are some limits to this approach.
These trade groups are not composed of naive, idealistic scientists who
have limited experience with patents and limited interest in product
development. Their members are the same hard-nosed, pragmatic,
profit-maximizing firms that the federal government is trying to entice
into developing products out of government-sponsored inventions
through its patent policy.
Position statements from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA) and from two biotechnology trade groups that have
since merged, the Industrial Biotechnology Association (IBA) and the
Association of Biotechnology Companies (ABC), expressed views on
the NIH patent applications that contradict the hypothesis that patent
protection for those particular discoveries is necessary in order to
protect the interests of firms that might develop related products in the
future. 8 The PMA and the IBA both urged that NIH not seek patent
5 See, e.g., Hyman Rickover, Government Patent Policy, 60 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 14
(1978).
6 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 3; Adler, supra note 3.
7 See Eisenberg, supra note 3.
8 Letter from Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association, to L.W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, May 28,
1992; Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n, IBA Position Paper: Recommended Federal
Policy Concerning Human Genetic Sequences Discovered by Federal Researchers,
Contractors and Grantees (June 1992); Ass'n of Biotechnology Companies, ABC
Statement on NIH Patent Filing for the Human Genome Project (May 1992). These
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protection on DNA sequences whose biological function is unknown
but instead place such sequences in the public domain. 9 The third
group, the ABC, supported the NIH decision to seek patent protection,
but only as a means of generating revenues for the government and not
as a means of ensuring the availability of exclusive rights in those
sequences for firms. 10 Indeed, even the ABC urged that the patents be
licensed on a nonexclusive basis so as not to block development projects
in industry. Although this position is nominally consistent with current
federal patent policy, it contradicts its underlying rationale by
conceding that, at least in this particular case, exclusive rights in
discoveries could interfere with their effective commercial
development. Generating royalty income for the government has never
been among the justifications for patenting the results of governmentsponsored research, 1 1 and it would be a singularly unpersuasive
justification inasmuch as the public would have to pay the royalties
under such patents as consumers (in the form of higher product prices)
to collect them as taxpayers (in the form of NIH revenues).
These reactions to the NIH cDNA patent applications suggest that
even if patenting government-sponsored inventions will sometimes
promote their subsequent development into commercial products, at
other times it will retard progress toward that goal, and that some
government-sponsored inventions will be exploited, even widely
exploited, if left in the public domain. The course of scientific
discovery and product development is incredibly complex and variable
and unpredictable. Neither the old-fashioned approach of leaving all
new discoveries in the public domain, nor the current approach of
assigning exclusive rights in such discoveries to private parties, should be
statements are analyzed in Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 907 and in Adler, supra note
3, at 912-913.
9 Letter from G.J. Mossinghoff to L.W. Sullivan, supra note 8; Industrial
Biotechnology Ass'n, supra note 8.
10 Ass'n of Biotechnology Companies, supra note 8.
11 See Healy, supra note 3, at 665 ("The rationale is not to make money, but
rather to promote and encourage the development and commercialization of products
to benefit the public, and to do so in a socially responsible way.")
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uniformly applied across the entire range of publicly-supported
discoveries. In our eagerness to avoid the inadequacies of the public
domain approach, we may have moved too quickly and too
emphatically in the opposite direction, to the point where today patent
rights in some government-sponsored discoveries may actually be
undermining, rather than supporting, incentives to develop new
products and bring them to market.
Prior to 1980 the policy and practice of the federal government
with respect to patenting the results of government-sponsored research
varied among agencies, and sometimes from one institutional
agreement to the next. 12 In 1980, Congress passed two statutes that
have set the course for government technology transfer policy since that
time. The first of these statutes, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act, 13 made technology transfer an integral part of the
R&D responsibilities of federal laboratories and their employees. The
14
second, commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act (Bayh-Dole),
focussed more explicitly on the role of patents in technology transfer,
reversing the prior practice of some federal agencies of retaining public
ownership of inventions made outside the government with federal
funds. Under Bayh-Dole, small businesses and nonprofit organizations
who were sufficiently diligent in seeking patent rights and promoting
commercial development of inventions were to retain patent ownership
themselves. In October 1983, President Reagan the benefits that BayhDole had provided for small businesses and nonprofit organizations to
all government contractors, including large businesses, so that now they
too could retain patent ownership on inventions made in their
15
laboratories with federal funds.
12

See James A. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development

Contracts,53 Va. L.Rev. 564 (1967).
13 Pub. L. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
3701-3714).
14 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-27 (1980) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 201-211).
15 Presidential Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Subject: Government Patent Policy, 1983 Pub. Papers 248.

Eisenberg: Problems with Patenting Research Tools 167

Congress passed a series of amendments to Bayh-Dole in 1984

extending its provisions to inventions originating at government-owned,
contractor-operated facilities and repealing limitations on the
permissible duration of licenses from nonprofit organizations to large
businesses on government-sponsored inventions. 1 6 Then, with passage
of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986,17 Congress
authorized federal laboratories to enter into cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs) with entities in both the public
and private sectors and to agree in advance to assign or license to the
collaborating party any patents on inventions to be made by federal
employees in the course of collaborative research.
Subsequent legislation and executive orders have continued to
broaden and fortify the emerging pro-patent policy, 1 8 attempting to
close any loopholes that might leave potentially valuable discoveries in
the public domain. Today, we have in place a system that virtually
guarantees that wherever federally-sponsored inventions are made,
whether in government, university, or private laboratories, if anyone
involved in the research project wants the discovery to be patented, they
may prevail over the objections of anyone who thinks the discovery
16 Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 [Trademark Clarification Act of 1984].
17 Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Star. 1785 (amending the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act of 1980).
18 See, e.g., Technology Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 Title
V, Subtitle B, Part I, Subpart B, 102 Stat. 1107, 1433-39; National Technical
Information Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-519, Title II, Subtitle B, 102 Stat. 2589,
2594-96; National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-189, Division C, Tide XXXI, Part C, 103 Stat. 1352, 1674-79; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Tide VIII, Part C, %
827-828; 104 Stat. 1485, 1606-07 (1990); American Technology Preeminence Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-245, Title I, § 108, 106 Stat. 7, 13; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, Division C, Tide XXXI,
Subtitle C, § 3135(b), 106 Star. 2315, 2640-41; Executive Order No. 12,591, 3
C.F.R. 221 (1987); Executive Order No. 12,618 3 C.F.R. 262 (1987); Proclamation
No. 6489, 57 F.R. 47,249 (1992). The trend continues in currently pending
legislation. See, e.g., S. 1537 and H.R. 3590 (directing all federal laboratories to
assign to their private sector partners the title to any intellectual property arising from
a CRADA) and H.R. 3550 (establishing a "Technology Transfer and
Commercialization Corporation" to act as the federal government's agent in
facilitating the transfer of patents, licenses, processes and technologies for
commercialization in the private sector).
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should be placed in the public domain. Thus, for example, if a
university is reluctant to patent a discovery made in its laboratories with
federal funds, the sponsoring agency may insist on obtaining a
patent. 19 If a government agency or university has no interest in
pursuing a patent, the individual investigator who made the discovery
may step in and claim patent rights. 20 If anyone sees money to be
made through patenting a government-sponsored research discovery, if
they have the sophistication and resources to pursue patent rights,
chances are it will be patented.
Now, all of this makes a good deal of sense if we want all
government-sponsored research discoveries to be patented. But I think
there are reasons to question the effectiveness of patents as a means of
promoting technology transfer in some contexts. At their best, patents
provide essential incentives to undertake costly investments in product
development. At their worst, they can create obstacles to subsequent
R&D and add to a thicket of rights that firms must negotiate their way
past before they can get their products on the market.
Patent protection is most likely to be an effective device for
achieving technology transfer in the case of a patent that covers an end
product for sale to consumers. It is least likely to be effective, and most
likely to interfere with subsequent research and product development,
in the case of a patent on a research tool that is to be used in subsequent
stages of R&D but will not be incorporated into the end product as it is
ultimately sold.
The essence of the argument for patenting research discoveries as a
means of promoting their subsequent development into useful products
is that patents permit the firms that invest in product development to
reap the rewards of their investment through profits without facing
competition from free riders that have not shared in the costs and risks
of development. Patent rights enhance incentives to develop products
by allowing firms to keep would-be competitors out of their markets
for a while. During the patent term, firms can charge monopoly prices,
19 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1),(2).

20 35 U.S.C. § 202(d); 15 U.S.C. § 3710d.
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and thereby earn an enhanced return on their development costs and
compensation for their risks. Thus patent rights are most likely to
promote product development when they ensure the patent holder or
licensee of a commercially effective monopoly in the relevant product
market. Patents on some discoveries lend themselves more readily than
patents on other discoveries to protecting the monopoly positions of
innovating firms.
Generally, the most effective commercial protection, and therefore
the most powerful incentive to invest in product development, is
provided by a patent on an end product that is sold to consumers.
Subject to the availability of substitute products that are outside the
scope of the patent, such a patent confers a right to exclude competitors
from the market for the patented product entirely, regardless of how
they make it or what they use it for.
Somewhat less effective are process patents covering a specific use of
an unpatented product. So long as there are other uses for the product
that are not covered by the patent, the patent holder cannot stop
competitors from selling the unpatented product itself and thereby
driving down its price. If the product is available in the market at
competitive prices from a variety of sources, it may be impossible to
monitor what purchasers are using it for.
Also less effective are patents on starting materials or processes used
in making an unpatented end product. Such patents do not prevent a
competitor from making the product from different materials or
through a different process, or even from using the patented materials
overseas and then importing the unpatented end product into the
U.S. 2 1 Such a patent may also be difficult to enforce because of
practical problems in detecting and proving infringing activities in the
manufacturing process that are not apparent from inspection of the end
product as it is sold in the market.
Weaker still is a patent that claims products or processes that are
used only during product development. Not only is it difficult to
detect and prove infringement of such a patent, but often the only
21 Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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effective remedy even for proven infringement will be damages, because
an injunction against future use of the invention will not thwart the
efforts of a competitor who has already finished using the invention.
One could argue for a substantial damage remedy if use of the
patented product was an essential step in developing a lucrative
product, and if infringement was willful the court has discretion to
treble the amount of damages. 22 But so long as the competitor no
longer needs to use the patented invention in the manufacturing stage,
an injunction against future infringement would not serve to keep the
competitor off the market.
So firms that are interested in developing end products for sale to
consumers are unlikely to see patents on research tools as a very
effective means of promoting their market exclusivity. Instead, they
will see such patents as potential stumbling blocks that they need to
negotiate their way past in order to develop their products. Such
patents may generate royalty income for their owners, and the prospect
of earning royalties may make it more profitable to develop further
research tools in the private sector, but it is unlikely to enhance the
incentives of firms to develop end products through the use of those
research tools.
Of course, one firm's research tool may be another firm's end
product. This is particularly likely in the contemporary biotechnology
industry, where research is big business and there is money to be made
by developing and marketing research tools for the use of other firms.
So, for example, even as the PMA and the IBA were calling upon NIH
to leave its cDNA sequence information in the public domain, new
firms were being formed to do further cDNA sequencing in the private
sector, presumably with the hope of obtaining their own patent
rights. 23 It may well make sense to have this particular task performed
in the private sector, and patents may enhance the incentives of firms to
step in. On the other hand, it may make more sense to leave this
22 35 U.S.C. § 284.
23 See Lawrence M. Fisher, Mining the Genome: Big Science as Big Business, New
York Times, Jan. 30, 1994, Sec. 1, at 1, col. 3.
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information in the public domain, even if that means that the
government has to continue to bear the cost of generating it.
There are reasons to be wary of patents on research tools. For one
thing, although the ultimate social value of such inventions is difficult
to measure in advance, it is likely to be greatest when they are widely
available to all researchers who might have a use for them.24 For years
this country has sustained a flourishing biomedical research enterprise in
which investigators have drawn heavily upon discoveries that their
predecessors left in the public domain. It is in the nature of patents that
they restrict access to inventions in order to increase profits to the
patent holder. A significant research project might call for access to a
great many research tools; the costs and administrative burden could
mount quickly if it were necessary for researchers to obtain separate
licenses for each of these tools.
Patents are unlikely to interfere significantly with access to research
tools by subsequent researchers in the case of an invention such as a
chemical reagent that is readily available on the market at a reasonable
price from a patent holder or licensee. Many of the tools of
contemporary biotechnology research are available by catalog under
conditions that approach an anonymous market. Under these
circumstances it may be cheaper and easier to obtain the tool from the
patent holder or a licensed source than it is to infringe the patent by
making it oneself.
But not all research tools are readily available on a licensed basis in
an anonymous market. Some esoteric research tools can only be
obtained by approaching the patent holder directly and negotiating for
a license. In this context patents potentially pose a far greater threat to
subsequent researchers. Negotiating licenses for access to research tools
may present particularly difficult problems for would-be licensees who
don't want to disclose the directions of their research in its early stages
by requesting a license. There is also a risk that the holders of patents on
research tools will choose to license them on an exclusive rather than
24 See Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1017 (1989).
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nonexclusive basis, in the process choking off the R&D of other firms
before it gets off the ground. Such a licensing strategy may make sense
for a start-up company that is short on current revenues, even if it is not
value-maximizing in the long run from a broader social standpoint.
Another risk is that patent holders will try to use a device that has
been increasingly popular with some biotechnology firms of offering
licenses that call for the imposition of so-called "reach-through"
royalties on sales of products that are developed in part through use of
the research tool, even if the patented invention is not incorporated into
the final product. So far patent holders have had limited success with
such licenses. Firms have been willing to accept a reach-through royalty
obligation for licenses under the Cohen-Boyer patent on basic
recombinant DNA techniques, perhaps because the claims of that
patent in effect extend to products developed through use of the
patented technology. But reach-through royalty terms have met greater
market resistance for the patents on the Harvard recombinant oncomouse and polymerase chain reaction. Licenses with reach-through
royalty provisions might appear to solve the problem of placing a value
on a research tool before knowing the outcome of the research project,
but it takes little imagination to foresee the disincentives to product
development that they could create if they become prevalent. Each
reach-through royalty obligation becomes a prospective tax on sales of a
product. The more research tools are used in developing the product,
the higher the tax burden mounts.
For all of these reasons, exclusive rights may be expected to inhibit
the optimal utilization of research tools and interfere with product
development. Moreover, innovating firms are likely to have other patent
rights of their own in new products that are far more significant to their
market exclusivity (and therefore to their anticipated profits) than any
competitive advantage they obtain as a result of exclusive access to a
patented research tool. The earlier in R&D an invention is used, and
the more that remains to be done to develop a product, the more likely
it is that the innovating firm will make further patentable inventions of
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its own along the road to product development that are likely to be
incorporated in the final product. The absence of exclusive rights in
research tools is thus unlikely to undermine the incentives of innovating
firms to use those tools to develop new products.
A complication arises in the case of inventions that have significant
current value as research tools, but might also be incorporated into
commercial products at some time in the future. It may be necessary to
be able to offer exclusive rights in the ultimate commercial product to
innovating firms in order to give them adequate incentives to develop
the products. This possibility may argue in favor of patenting inventions
even if doing so is unnecessary to facilitate their present use as research
tools, and even if it inhibits that use.
Intermediate strategies are possible to minimize any inhibiting
effects on research. For example, one might add a research exemption
to Bayh-Dole that would protect researchers who later use patented
research tools developed with government funds from liability. Patent
holders would still be able to enforce their rights against those who
make, use or sell the inventions as commercial end products, including
competitors who sell the invention to investigators for use as a research
tool, but not against those who merely make and use the invention in
their own research. Obviously, such an exemption would limit the value
of patent rights in any government-sponsored invention that is useful
primarily or exclusively as a research tool, although the protection
against competitors who would sell the product to researchers provides
some measure of protection. So long as other large scale producers can
be excluded from the market, the patent holder will be able to reap the
benefits of any significant economies of scale in production of the
research tool. The lack of a remedy against researchers who make the
invention themselves would still set an upper bound on the ability of
patent holders to charge full monopoly prices, since at a certain point
researchers might find it cost effective to make the research tool
themselves rather than to buy it from the patent holder.
A variation on this approach would be to deny patent holders an
injunctive remedy against research users, but permit them to recover a
5 Risk: Health, Safety &Environment 163 [Spring 19941

reasonable royalty as damages. This would allow a tribunal to
administer a more fine-tuned remedy to ensure that patent holders
receive an adequate return where economies of scale are insufficient to
induce researchers completely exempt from infringement liability to
deal with the patent holder. It has the drawback of creating uncertainty
for patent holders and researchers as to the level of royalties that the
tribunal will deem reasonable. In an environment where some patent
holders demand reach-through royalties for use of research tools, the
potential damage remedy might seem intolerable to innovating firms.
And opening books to consider how much of a royalty is reasonable is
apt to be distasteful to firms on both sides of a dispute.
Of course, both of these approaches amount to compulsory licenses
for research users of patented inventions, although only the latter is a
royalty-bearing compulsory license. If they are perceived as such, they
may be opposed throughout the industry. Universities and
biotechnology start-up firms, who are most likely to be in a position to
collect royalties on sales of research tools, will have a financial incentive
to oppose any change in the law that reduces the value of patents on
research tools. Pharmaceutical firms, who derive their profits from
selling end products and have the most to gain from a policy that
facilitates free access to research tools, oppose any form of compulsory
licensing on principle, just as the National Rifle Association opposes any
form of gun control. Perhaps the first alternative, which denies a
damage remedy altogether, would seem less like a compulsory license
provision than the second alternative, which limits damages to a
reasonable royalty, although it is ultimately more hostile to the interests
of patent holders.
Any retreat from the broad giveaway of patent rights under present
law will inevitably be opposed by some people in industry. This does
not necessarily mean that a retreat would interfere with technology
transfer. The rhetoric surrounding current federal technology transfer
policy suggests that whatever is good for industry must be in the public
interest. This is a vast oversimplification of the issue. The biotechnology
industry is not monolithic. Rights that enhance the profits of small
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start-up firms may interfere with the research of established
pharmaceutical firms. The private sector responds to the profit
incentives created by whatever policies the government puts in place.
Whenever the government offer' new property rights, one would expect
someone to step forward to claim them (and to protest when it
threatens to take them away). It doesn't necessarily follow that those
property rights, on balance, will make us all better off.
I believe that patents have a critical role to play in promoting
technology transfer. But the incentives created by patent rights in
government-sponsored inventions would do little to compensate for the
damage we could do to our research enterprise if we allocate too much
of our new knowledge to private owners and too little to the public
25
domain. To quote a recent opinion by JudgeKozinski:
... Private property, including intellectual property, is
essential to our way of life. ... But reducing too much to
private property can be bad medicine. Private land, for
instance, is far more useful if separated from other
private land by public streets, roads and highways.
Public parks, utility rights-of-way and sewers reduce the
amount of land in private hands, but vastly enhance the
value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich
public domain.... Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles
the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
Government is uniquely situated to enrich our public domain. We
should be wary of disabling the government from performing this
critical function in our eagerness to enhance private incentives to put
existing discoveries to use.

25 Vanna White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th
Cir. 1993) (dissent from decision rejecting a petition for rehearing en banc).
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